Psychology and Culture: What Lies Ahead

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If you have read even 75 percent of this book, you have read a lot about culture and behavior. You have been exposed to a wide range of information—some of it more or less obviously interrelated, some of it not so. Your guides in this venture have been accomplished researchers who share our interests in expanding psychology's vistas. We will take some space here to comment on where you have been, on what the issues were—and are—and on what are the implications of having somewhat expanded your comprehension of the world. Some issues are simply those the various chapters are obviously about. Others cut through the individual chapters. We'll try to elaborate on some of these, as well as to emphasize some themes we think are particularly in need of repeating. First, we comment on the concrete aspects of confronting another culture as a traveler, and on some aspects of the value of a broadened understanding of human thought and behavior. Then we will examine some ideas about where this field of scholarship is headed, and close with an invitation to join us.

EVERYTHING'S DIFFERENT; EVERYTHING'S THE SAME

Adult men and women everywhere are mostly unself-conscious examples of their culture. They embody cultural differences. Children, however, seem to have a universal quality that in many ways makes them appear very similar across cultures, at least superficially. They have the same kind of look about them—large heads, big eyes. They're cute. But very early they become children of their own culture, and therefore very early they become different. Children are born to couples who are generally recognized as belonging to a more or less stable relationship, and as having responsibility—in some sense of that term—for their children. But the ways in which children relate to their biological parents, and the social roles the parents and the families they came from relate to their children are remarkably variable around the world. The economics of marriage also differ widely. In some places, such as India, the pressures for new wives to bring wealth into the husband's family (dowry) are so great that wives who fail to respond to the demands of the husband's family are often killed. Now that sounds very strange to a North American mind. Yet spouses are killed in North America daily, some in arguments about family issues, and family economics, or as a result of alcoholism—a condition that is nearly unknown in India. We might reasonably ask, what's the difference? No difference? Totally different? It reminds us of the story, from a few years ago now, of the two economists, one American, one Polish, comparing the economic systems of their two nations. The Polish economist claimed there was no difference between the two economies. The American objected, saying there was a vast difference. The Pole responded with an example:

Pole: "OK, look at the marketplace. In the United States, You can buy anything you want with dollars, and nothing with Zloty's (the Polish currency). Right?"
American: "Right."
Pole: "Right! Same in Poland!"

To a great degree, the extent of differences among cultures will depend on the level of abstrac-
tion at which you approach them. A visitor from
North America to a new and different land deals
first with lots of concrete and specific differences, at
a very low level of abstraction. The people look
different. Their clothes look different. Their lan-
guage is different. The taxicab may be a motor-
scooter with an enclosed bench on the back, or it
may be open, and pedalled rather than motor
driven. Outside the airport your bags may be
grabbed so fast you can’t respond and taken to your
cab by boys (hardly ever girls) who then surround
you wanting to be paid. You are outside the airport
for 20 seconds and already you are hit with culture
shock.

You go to a restaurant, find an empty table that
has room for four, and sit down. You are soon joined
by a group of three who fill up the table, talk with
each other, and pay no attention to you apart from
an initial smile and a nod. This makes you only
slightly uncomfortable. You may find that in public
toilets the facility is not a toilet with a seat, but
rather a porcelain aperture in the floor with raised
places on which to put your feet. After a moment it
occurs to you that you are supposed to squat. At
least there is no question of how clean is the seat! By
this time, you may feel not very much at home, and
may wish you were. But in the face of these differ-
ences in customs—in how things are done—we
should not lose sight of the fact that the things that
are done are familiar, at a higher level of abstrac-
tion.

There was a “cab” at the airport.
There were “porters” there to help you with
your bags.
The porters wanted to be tipped.
There are public restaurants, where people
gather to sit and talk.
There are public toilets.

Being joined at the table is a really simple dif-
ference in custom. But it comes as a surprise the
first time it happens, when you’re from North
America where a single person generally is left to
occupy a table for four alone. You can accept this
difference easily. It is a pretty concrete event, and it
may not have any more general implication about
social behavior and culture. After all, North Ameri-
cans sit elbow to elbow with complete strangers in
theaters, church, and school. Why not in restau-

rant?

Some differences are less easy to accept at first,
but are also understood with a little thought. In
some places, cows roam the streets, are not owned
by people or families, and are not eaten. In other
places, dogs are kept by villagers, and are eaten.
These differences may signal differences that per-
sist at higher levels of abstraction.

Let’s try to draw a thumbnail sketch of what
happens when you face concrete cultural differ-
ences as simple as those noted above. We’ll attempt
a brief cognitive analysis of cross-cultural experi-
ence. The meaning of all objects and events is de-

fined by the automatic associations that are
triggered when we perceive the object or its sym-

bolic form (e.g., a word that names it). For many
objects and events, these associations appear also to
contain the anticipation of a series of events (some-
times called scripts) in which we act in certain
ways, others in the environment respond in antici-
pated ways, and the whole set of events goes as
expected. To a large degree, this is what it means to
be a competent actor in some culture—to have your
expectations about what will happen and how to
act in most situations fit with the actual unfolding
of the events. The very fact that these are automatic
processes, requiring little conscious awareness and
calculation, allows us to navigate most of our inter-
actions effortlessly. Life is different, however, when
we cannot rely on the automatic responses we
know so well, and have to consider our options, for
both interpretation and action and for their appro-
priateness.

So when one’s expectations are not confirmed,
and when the things that actually happen signal
that bad things may result, it is understandable that
one might respond with a certain amount of appre-
hension. To make it worse, when you get off the
airplane after 20+ hours of travel, you are already in
a vulnerable condition. So when you get to your
destination, and the young men grab for your lug-
gage, you can be forgiven for thinking what you
might reasonably think in other places (back
home?) that you are about to lose some of your
belongings. Then they want to be tipped. That’s no
big thing. It is easy to understand tipping in that
context. But then you are confronted with trying to
figure out how much to tip, in a currency which you
do not understand, and where you do not know
what is enough, and what is too much. There are
lots of situations like this. A major characteristic of
them is that your own cultural scripts don’t work
very well, and sometimes they shout danger when
it doesn’t exist. It doesn’t take much intelligence to
figure things out, but often the time demands don’t
help. It would be easy to figure out how much to tip
the guys who helped with your baggage. You might
think of calculating the exchange rate based on an appropriate tip in New York, and give that. But it might be too much. After all, you don’t want to be a “patsy.” You could ask the cab driver. But the point is that any of these things will take seconds to do—seconds in which you imagine that the world has stopped to look at you while you figure things out. It would be nice if you could have a nap before you decide. It takes a while to figure out that one of the highest purposes of tourists is to leave money behind for the benefit of the people who made the travel memorable.

But wait a minute. Is this the kind of cultural knowledge that this book is about? Well, yes, and no. This kind of cultural knowledge may not seem to go very deep, but it is just the kind of confrontation with another culture that puts people off. Ready understanding of simple events and differences is really useful, and allows one to move further. You may recall from the introductory chapter that this is what happened to LeAnn during her second trip to France. People interpret each other’s behavior all the time. We go through life giving and interpreting one-item tests. We see someone fail to act in a quick and clever way, and diagnose “stupidity.” We hear someone say something inept, and diagnose “insensitivity.” Who knows what our accuracy rates are for our cultural peers, but it’s likely to be less when there is a discrepancy in cultural experience. Being from North America, we’d rather not have our appreciation for subtlety of color and design judged against an Indian standard, or our ability at language to be judged against a European standard.

BROADER PERSPECTIVES

Some people are able to encompass the rules of more than one culture. These are very interesting people. For emphasis and clarity, permit one of us (RSM) to report one of his experiences in first person singular.

Of the people I have met, over the course of 30 years of involvement in cross-cultural research, there are some whose understanding of the world I would like to have or to emulate. While I have been fortunate to meet people from many places around the world, few are fundamentally different from people I know at home in the depth or breadth of their understanding. There are many whose life experiences are rich and who have seen and lived through things that I have not. But then they have not lived through what I have lived through. They are as limited as I am. It’s just that their limitations are restricted to different things.

People who are really interesting are those whose understanding extends into more than one life—more than one world. I remember, for example, the most important lecture I ever had about cross-cultural research methods. It was delivered by the Chief of a band of MicMac Indians in Nova Scotia, Canada. The story is worth telling because it shows a depth and sensitivity of experience in this man whose education was cultural, but not based in school.

I was setting out to measure the values of the members of the 40 or so households in this group. My colleagues and I had lived with these people for a couple of months, and had very consciously managed our contacts with them so that no household would see us very much more or less than any other. We had spent a lot of time in their homes—the best and the worst—had eaten at nearly every table, and as a fundamental part of our research, we had been very interested in their views on all sorts of issues relating to their community, their history, their relations with other communities, and many other things. I grew to like and respect these people, even though I was still somewhat nervous about being a 25-year-old novice researcher in a community of people who must have seen me as a strange event in their lives.

The people knew that we would write reports of our experience with them—we had told them that much about our purposes. When we conversed with them informally it seemed to us that there was little attempt to conceal their views and feelings. They seemed very open, friendly, and expressive. Obviously, we were strangers, and would not get the same kinds of candor people would share within their family and community, but within those limits, our interactions felt genuine. But we wanted to do more than talk informally. We wanted DATA—data that come in “objective” forms, on questionnaires, and that are amenable to statistical analysis. So we went to the band Chief to get permission to administer questionnaires throughout the community: questionnaires about cultural values.

He could not allow it. He explained the difference between the informal conversations we had been having with his people and the formal interaction of a questionnaire. He reminded us that the people would know that what they would say on the questionnaire would find its way into print, and that they would say nothing to cast themselves and
their community in a bad light. His view was that they also would do nothing to jeopardize the respect they felt we had for them. Rather, they would tell us what they wanted us and the world to think of them. That would not be an accurate reflection of their community, he said, and so he could not allow it. He suggested we just keep talking with the people if we wanted to understand.

Privately, I was embarrassed. I knew well all the arguments he gave us, and had the feeling that I had just had a finger wagged at me by an experienced researcher—or maybe I was getting a pat on the head. He was right, of course, and I have carried that lesson with me ever since. But the point of the story is that this man lived in a world of more than one culture and understood much of the rules, processes, and preferences of both. What’s more, he was reflective and articulate about the differences and their implications. I felt that his knowledge of the world was superior to mine because it could encompass more ways to look at things.

There is something interesting about this way of looking at knowledge. If there is no single and simple answer to the more interesting questions in this world, then being knowledgeable may well involve knowing a lot of possible answers and having ways to choose among them. If that’s so, it is a good argument for knowing about “culture.”

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

There really are two contexts in which to consider much of our knowledge of behavior and its cultural surroundings. The first is the formal knowledge that comes from empirical studies, theoretical analyses, and the systematic examination of first-hand observations. This is the sort of knowledge found in the published research literature in cross-cultural psychology. And it results in the kind of knowledge that is the substance of much of this book. But there is another kind of knowledge that is at least as interesting, at least as important, but not as well studied. It is the kind of cultural experience and comprehension that allows one to understand another culture “deeply” and to act appropriately. It is the kind of knowledge we wrote about briefly earlier.

It seems clear that these two kinds of knowledge may not be very highly correlated. Plenty of people who are consummate “natives” in various Western or other societies would be hard pressed indeed to say anything very intelligent about culture and behavior from a scientific or formal point of view. Certainly one could find people with a very sharp formal understanding of culture who are not outstanding as practitioners of even their own (first) culture.

An interesting question concerns whether there is some point in life beyond which one cannot learn to be a “native” actor in a second (or third) culture. Is there a point beyond which we are forever destined to be “an upstate New Yorker,” or a “man from Montana” (assuming these to be subvariants of U.S. culture)? What kinds of learning experiences lead us to be acceptable and appropriate actors in new lands? We hesitate to propose that there is a critical period for acquisition of cultural knowledge, but perhaps it is only early in life that we can acquire “unaccented behavior” just as we acquire unaccented speech.

Of course it is not an all or nothing matter. Some cultural learning, some progress towards becoming a native actor, can be very helpful in interpreting events in a new cultural context. Knowledge of culture in the second sense (implicit understanding) may be important in acquiring cultural knowledge of the first sense (formal knowledge), because observations need interpretation before they can be fed into the formal grinder of science.

The interplay of formal and informal knowledge doesn’t stop here. We think most scientists would agree that the origin of good ideas in science is something of a mystery. It seems clear that they are closely related to “the times” (Zeitgeist, or spirit of the times), but some people have a knack of generating ideas that will turn out to be worthwhile. Yet we know of no one in the world of universities who has ever told of a course offered for graduate students on “how to have a good idea in (whatever field).” While that’s what everybody is quite obviously working towards, they aren’t explicitly taught how to do it (just as they most often are not explicitly taught how to teach!).

Most researchers who have thought much about it would probably also agree that the main business of science as a rational process has to do with evaluating and choosing among competing explanations for observations, or “phenomena.” Science and its great repertoire of methods and methodologies is powerful as a choice strategy, but it has almost nothing to say about where to get the alternatives to be chosen among in the first place.
There's a story (we've forgotten the source) of a young magician who went out to buy a magic card trick at the store. He thought he was going to buy knowledge about the "magic" of the trick. When he got the package home, the instructions said: "bring the target card to the top of the deck by your favorite technique." He thought that was the magic, and having bought the trick he was still as much in the dark as before. Having good, and maybe new, ideas is part of the magic of science. Where do good ideas come from? How can we have more of them?

These questions lead to some intriguing implications, and it may be worthwhile to sketch where they might lead. Where do we get the knowledge that we use to understand new or puzzling events? Unless you want to admit the possibility of some kind of primal or genetic memory, it has to come through our life experience. If you accept the idea that both formal knowledge-developing processes (e.g., science) and informal or personal knowledge depend first on generating alternative possible "truths," then the person who can generate more possibilities, from a greater diversity of perspectives, will more likely end up with useful knowledge. So it is quite possible that the person who has had the more diverse experience—in both the sense of personal experience and formal experience—will generate more alternatives. How do we come to understand more? By being able to generate more alternative understandings, upon which the formal analytical thought processes can operate. Through reading, thinking, meeting new people, experiencing new places, and playing around with ideas, we become able to generate more contexts, more different points of view from which to generate alternative knowledges. One way to move in this direction is to learn about a diversity of cultures and the ways in which they shape thought and behavior. Many people through years of exposure to both formal and informal knowledge about cultures eventually become sophisticated and sensitive in their understanding of the world. We hope this book assists you in that direction.

Perhaps we should apologize for having complicated your life. From now on, when you encounter a specific difference between how it is done where you're from and how it is done among the people you will meet, you not only have to decide whether it is a fundamental or arbitrary difference (like what side of the road cars are driven on), but also from what perspective it ought to be viewed—relativist, universalist, or absolutist (see Adamopoulos & Lonner, Chapter 18).

THE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

The authors of the chapters in this book have already voluntarily, and gladly, complicated their lives by sharing a strong interest in studying the complex interrelationships between psychology and culture. Topical coverage in this volume has been as broad and representative of the field of psychology as we could make it, given the space limitations that any book imposes. Most contributors to this book, including ourselves, are "hardcore" cross-cultural psychologists. This means that we scarcely ever think of any topic or concept in psychology without considering its implications in a broader international context. Despite our strong identification with this particular way of looking at the world, we are not (yet, at least) so totally blinded by this perspective that we have lost the ability to ask questions about what we do and why we do it. A scientist who doesn't ask questions about what he or she does has lost something very important—the ability to wonder and to search for the often elusive truth. Thus, we frequently turn the binoculars around and look at ourselves with our own eyes, penetratingly and critically. We try to answer questions such as "What does all this mean?" "What do we really know about interrelationships between psychology and culture?" "What is the future of cross-cultural psychology?" "Maybe we're interested in these topics, but does the rest of the world care?"

To develop some context for this exercise in self-examination, we will present an analogy. In doing so, we will provide some information about a debate that has interested many who study relationships between language, thought, and reality. The last four words of the last sentence were the title of an influential book written nearly forty years ago by Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956). Whorf was an insurance adjuster who was fascinated with human languages, so much so that he became a very well-known amateur anthropologist who attracted a sizeable following of scholars. Whorf's basic idea—which has variously been called the Whorfian hypothesis, the Sapir-Whorf, or the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis (Edward Sapir was a famous anthropologist who worked closely with Whorf for number of years), contained two interrelated hypotheses about language. The first was that all languages are relative to one time and place, and hence are not entirely intelligible to speakers of any other...
language. The second hypothesis posited that language, any language, is singularly important in shaping how a person sees and thinks about the world. Thus, language determines what we think, what we see, and how our "reality" is constructed. Some even argue that a culture can never be known by an outsider unless and until its language has been mastered.

Claims by devoted "Whorfians" over the years have been interesting and stimulating, and they have sometimes bordered on the preposterous. For example, Whorfians have argued that if a group of people have many opportunities to develop different words for snow or sand (Eskimos and desert dwellers, for instance), and others have not, their vocabulary will be such that they can actually see things others cannot see. Such claims have little basis in fact, as explained in a recent book, The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax (Pulpm, 1991). Nevertheless, words and concepts do in fact contribute to how humans think about the world. For instance, the rabid fan who would rather watch football (U.S. variety) on television than eat, or the highly experienced football coach, will "see" things on the football field, and develop words for what he sees, at a far greater and more sophisticated level than those who know hardly anything about the game. A football play called "wideout right, veer centerpost X, double D route" might be exceptionally clear to a coach, but would likely be total nonsense to anyone with little interest in sports. Similarly, the clinical psychologist who says that her patient "has a residue of latent hostility brought about by repressed, secondary libidinal processes that were arrested in pre-puberty rituals within the family" might be "seeing" things, on the basis of a highly specified language, that others cannot. Maybe what language does is to provide a road map to help like-minded people negotiate very complicated terrain. Maybe it's true that language and culture are one and the same.

In a book that is also concerned with interrelationships between language and culture, Berlin and Kay (1969) showed that the number of terms that humans use to describe colors can be understood in "evolutionary" ways. The essential idea here is that (1) all cultures naturally use terms to describe colors, and (2) the number of color terms that a culture has is largely a function of how "advanced" the culture is. Putting it in less pejorative terms (because in this context evolution is not associated with Darwinian theory), it appears that a culture will develop words for colors to the extent it needs those terms to survive. Berlin and Kay showed that "focal" colors (essentially the terms used to denote the basic colors found in the visible electromagnetic spectrum) have emerged among cultures in a definite, developmental sequence. Thus, if a culture has only two words for focal colors, they will be black and white. If a third term exists it will predictably be red, followed by green and/or yellow, then blue, then brown, and next purple, pink, orange, and grey. Only in highly sophisticated and technologically advanced cultures will one find words such as mauve, burgundy, ecru, and chartreuse. It's not that less "advanced" peoples cannot actually see colors that have been described by such specialized terms; they simply don't need such a refined and varied vocabulary to describe the enormous range of hues (stimuli) that the electromagnetic spectrum provides for anyone to see. Nature is an equal opportunity employer; cultures and their variable demands are more selective in determining what is important to know.

Back to analogy, now that some context has been given. How likely is it, you suppose, that all the peoples of the world look at phenomena in the same way psychologists or anthropologists do? If you agree with us, you'll assert that it's not very likely. You might even express some relief that they don't! We pointed out in the introductory chapter that the word "culture" is not a God-given term. Rather, it was created by scholars and others to serve as a convenient guide, or marker, to help explain variations in the behavior of people in different parts of the world. Thus, consistent with Whorf's ideas about language, thought, and reality, a cross-cultural psychologist may be able to see a pattern of culture-mediated behavior—perhaps giving it a term like "collectivism," "clinical depression," or "stereotyping"—and make a big deal out of it, while most people would rather go fishing.

The analogy extends to Berlin and Kay's research on the evolution of basic color terms. Suppose that people in a "primitive" culture had only one word that they used to describe a particular position or function in their culture that a person from a highly advanced culture would call "scientific." What function would that word describe? We suggest that it might relate to numbers or arithmetic in some way; after all, counting things seems to be of paramount importance to any group regardless of its level of sophistication. What if the culture had a second term to describe the activities it does within its borders? We suspect that this second word would describe something similar to what
physicists do—that is, to try and understand how the world works. A third word might describe the work of people who try to save lives, people who are called physicians in the industrialized world. Of course, these words would likely not translate directly into mathematician, physicist, or physician—but they would be functionally equivalent.

Maybe you’ve seen what we’re driving at: the number and sophistication of words that a culture has developed that are used to describe those people who do “scientific” things is very directly related to how technologically advanced a society is. Modern psychology, important as we think it is, is only about 115 years old. In the grand sweep of things, the importance of psychology may be miniscule compared to the importance of the more “basic” disciplines of math, physics, chemistry, and the like, all of which can be traced to the ancient Greeks and even much earlier. We suspect that the earliest people who roamed the planet were much more interested in how to move boulders with levers so they could plant more crops, and what to do about illnesses that wiped out whole tribes, than they were about the nature of a neighboring tribe’s value structure or philosophy. Putting it bluntly, psychology as it is understood and practiced in the West is definitely not a universal discipline. We think that it should be, and we have a hunch that it eventually will be, but currently it isn’t. To a very large extent psychology, as we know it and as it has been portrayed in this book, is strongly associated with the highly Westernized, highly “psychologized,” and relatively affluent world. Ever since the barbarism of the Nazi regime resulted in a great “brain drain” from Germany in the 1930’s, the United States has had the largest number of psychologists—well over 100,000 today—which probably leads the world in the proportion of psychologists per million inhabitants. However, with differing societal definitions of who or what a psychologist is, we can’t be sure of such figures. Not far behind the United States in psychologists per capita are a number of Western countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Israel. Several countries with large populations, such as Russia and China, have relatively few psychologists. Moreover, the qualifications to become a psychologist vary considerably around the world. So do the functions that psychologists serve. Argentina, for instance, has a large number of active, energetic, and resourceful psychologists, but a very high percentage of them practice a type of psychology that is hardly even known in the Northern hemisphere. However, Argentine psychologists are well aware of cross-cultural psychology, and see it as very important as they continue to develop psychology within their country. Two highly related books give interesting accounts of how psychology is defined and practiced throughout the world (Russell, 1984; Sexton and Misiak, 1984). A helpful overview of “Psychology in a World Context” can be found in McConnell and Philipchalk (1992).

Related to this pattern of national and regional differences in the nature of psychology around the world is a growing movement called the “indigenization of psychology.” When something is indigenous it is “locally grown” and “locally valid.” Thus, many people believe that psychologists should not be as concerned about developing universal laws as they should be about developing a psychology that is valid for a particular society because it has been developed in that society by psychologists who have always lived and worked there (see Kim and Berry, 1993).

We have noted throughout this book that a growing number of psychologists in many countries are focusing on culture and ethnicity as major influences on human behavior. These psychologists might call themselves cross-cultural psychologists, cultural psychologists, ethnic psychologists, or indigenous psychologists. Regardless of which description they prefer, they share a common belief: In an increasingly complex world, psychology’s traditionally narrow perspectives must take into account cultural, ethnic, and ecological realities. As cultures evolve, so must psychology, and as psychology evolves, so must it involve culture. One particular researcher, perhaps from Switzerland, may wish to help establish universal principles of behavior by comparing many cultures on some common dimension. Another, from Kenya, may derive primary satisfaction from understanding behavior only in the culture he or she calls home. A third, from the United States, might wish to understand the various ways in which Native Americans or African Americans define, diagnose, and help prevent psychopathology. Psychologists who are interested in studying how culture influences behavior form an interesting mosaic in terms of methodological priorities and how problems are defined and studied with different methodologies. As the interrelationships between psychology and culture continue to evolve, so too will the ways to conceptualize and study these interrelationships. Cultures and ethnic groups are living and changing phenomena; psy-
Psychology must continue to be prepared to meet the challenges of studying how such groups affect the thought and behavior of individuals.

AN INVITATION TO "JOIN THE PARTY"

Cross-cultural psychology, which we and most of the contributors to this volume represent, has been an identifiable method in psychology for many years. However, as mentioned in the introduction, it gained "formal" status as a field by itself only about 25 or 30 years ago. It has its own organization called the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, its own publications, including the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology and the Cross-Cultural Psychology Bulletin. It enjoys cordial and scholarly relationships with other associations such as the Society for Cross-Cultural Research and a French-language organization called the Association pour la Recherche Interculturelle. Approximately 700 people in over 70 countries identify themselves as cross-cultural psychologists—but they all are first psychologists in some other aspect of more traditional psychology.

We hope that this book has stimulated your interest in this growing, and we think critically important, domain of psychology. We can provide you with details about the various organizations and publications. In the preface we listed the different ways you can contact either of us—by regular mail, telephone, facsimile (fax), or E-mail. We encourage you to join us in looking at human behavior from this broadened and broadening perspective.

REFERENCES